Abstract-
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure group communications (SGC) over networks (e.g, the Internet} refers to a setting in which a group of members can send messages to and receive messages from group members, in a way that outsiders are unable to glean any information even when they are able to intercept the messages. SGC is an inseparable component of cyber security.
Broad critical applications such as collaborative work, teleconferencing/medicine, multi-partner military action, and cyher forensics in critical fields depend on SGC for their security.
The most important problem facing SGC is group key management (GKM). The primary difficulty for GKM comes from member dynamics. How to design robust, scatabIe, efficient GKM protocols supporting high dynamics is the focus of all SGC researches. Many GKM prctocols have appeared in the literature and typically fall into three categories: centralized group key distribution (CGKD), decentralized group key management with relaying (DGKM), and (distributed) [18] . The main problem with using this key exchange mechanism is that the group members need synchronization to iteratively form parental keys from their two children's keys. Once one member is slow or one rekeying packet is delayed, the key agreement process will be postponed or even misoperates. Moreover, there are dependances among nodes' keys (i.e., a blinded node key is dependent on the secret node key and a parental key on its two child's keys). This dependance results in the breaking of all ancestral keys once one key is compromised.
To overcome the above problems we propose a new class of GKM protocols: called distributed group key distribution (DGKD). The DGKD protocol does not assume any trusted and more powerful third party but allows the equality of capability, responsibility, and trustiness among all group members. The protocol organizes the members in a tree structure and performs any rekeying operation in just two rounds, which do not need to be strictly synchronized. The new protocol also allows strong yct simple authentication. In addition, DGKD has the following advantages: (1) one kcy (not two keys) per node; (2) iridependance of nodes' keys; (3) robust against transmission delay, network failure or compromise of node keys. All these properties make the new protocol simple, robust, efficient and scalable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I1 briefly describes the related work in the area of SGC. We propose the new protocol in Section I11 and the issues of performance and security are discussed in Section IV.
Finally we conclude the paper in Section V. 1341, [351, 1361, 1371, 1381, 1121, 171, 1391, 1401, 1411, 1171, [1811 1421, 1431, 1441, 191, 1451 [49] , [19] , IS], [7] , 1411, 181, [9], [50], 1511 is the most typical approach. The schenie is simple, efficient, scalable, and casy to implenicnt. The sdienie can be used for both one-to-many multicast cornrtiunication ; a s well as many-to-many group cornmunication. Moreover the tree hascd GKM schcme has versions of both CGKD and CCKR.
DlSTRI3UTED GROUP KEY DISTRIBUTION (DGKD): A NEW CLASS OF GKM PROTOCOLS

A . Principle and assumption
There are some assumptions in existing schemes. In CGKD/DGKM, a secure channel is assumed to exist between the GC/SC and each of the potential group members/subgroup members. This secure channel is generally implemented by public key cryptosystems. In CGKA, which is typically based Diffte-Hellman key exchange which suffers from the Man-in-the-Middle attack, it is assumed that each group member is equipped with some authentication capability which is also implemented by public key cryptosystems. SimiIarly, DGKD assumes that every group member has a publicly known (unforgeable) public key.
The new DGKD protocol adopts a tree structure and utilizes three basic mechanisms to implement distributed key generation and distribution: 1) the leaf key of a node is the public key of the corresponding group member and all the intermediate nodes' keys are secret keys, 2) the sponsor of a joining or leaving member initiates the key generation and rekeying process and sends the new keys to co-distributors (i,e., the first round), 3) the co-distributors then help distribute the new keys to group members in a distributed/parallel manner (i.e., the second round).
All group members have the same capability and are equally trusted. Also, they have equal responsibility, i.e. any group member could be a potential sponsor of other members or a co-distributor (depending on the relative l u cations of the member and the joining/leaving members in the tree). Thus there is no dependance on a single entity and even if a sponsor node fails a new sponsor for the joining/leaving member is chosen by other members. This improves the robustness of the protocol.
B. Sponsor
A sponsor is a member and the sponsor of a subtree is defined as the member hosted on the rightmost leaf in the subtree (note: "rightmost" can be equally replaced with "leftmost"). Every node has an associated sponsor field as shown in Figure 1 .
The sponsor field at a particular node is updated when it is along the joining or leaving member's path. We show the joining algorithm for updating the sponsor field in Figures 2. When a member joins, the sponsor field along the joining members path is updated from bottom to the root. If the new members id is greater than the sponsor id of the node then update the sponsor id with the new member's id. This is continued until the root (See Figure 3) . When m7 joins, the sponsor field along its path is updated. The sponsor id of the node k6--7 is lesser than the id of m7, so it is updated t o 111. Similarly the sponsor id's of nodes k4-7 and k0-7 sponsor id for a node is greater than the joining members id then the check can be stopped. When a member leaves, every member checks along the path of the leaving member to update the sponsor field. If a node has the leaving member as the sponsor then they update the sponsor field with the sponsor id/member id of the other child if exists. This continues upto the root (See Figure 4) . When m 7 leaves, the sponsor field along its path is updated. Since the leaving member is the sponsor all along its path, the sponsor field has to be updated by checking for the new sponsor for all the nodes. m 6 becomes the new sponsor for node ks--7. For node k4--7 the member ids of both its children are compared and the greater becomes the new sponsor, in this case m6. This continues until the root.
C. Co-distributors
When a sponsor changes the keys along the path, it needs to distribute them. The sponsor has to distribute the keys to all the members whose keys have been changed. But it does not know the keys along the other paths to distribute the new keys. So, a cc-distributor is required to distribute them. The cedistributor is the sponsor of a node on another path whose key is not known to the original sponsor. The sponsor encrypts the changed key with the co-distributors public key and broadcasts this information.
Thus, the co-distributor helps the sponsor in distributing the changed common keys along the other paths.
D. Initial group key generation and distribution Protocol
Suppose n members m l , ......, mrr decide to form a group.
They build a virtual key tree and selects a sponsor to decide an order in which they join the tree. Every member updates the key tree by adding members in the key tree based on that order and they update the sponsor field in all the intermediate nodes. Then every member checks if it is responsible for generating any keys along its path. If so, it generates them and distributes the keys either directly or with the help of co-distributors. When two sponsors are responsible for generating the same key then the rightmost among them generates it. As more members join the key tree the sponsors and the height of the key tree increase.
As illustrated in Figure 5 , 7727, 7715, m3 and m l are responsible for generating the keys. m7 generates all the keys ( k6-7, k 4 -7 and k0-7 ) along its path to the root. Then it encrypts as follows and broadcasts: {k6-71 k4-7, k 0 --7 }~k~, and { k D --7 , k 4 -7 } p k s . m5 will decrypt k0-7 and k4--7 and encrypt it as Ik0-7, k4-7}k4--5 where k~+ is generated by m5 and sent to m 4 . Similarly keys are generated by m3 in the left subtree along its path and the root key which is generated by the rightmost sponsor m7 is sent to the co-distributor of the left subtree m3 as follows. is broadcast and m3 will decrypt kO-y and encrypts it as { k~-7 } k~-~ and broadcasts it. Thus every member has the newly generated keys along its path. Only two rounds are required for this protocol, one round for generating keys and distributing along the path and another for codistributors to distribute them.
E. Join protocol
Step 1: New member broadcasts request for join
Step 2: Every meniber
. updates the key tree by adding a new member node . Find sponsor for joining member:
. jf sibling present, sponsor = sibling
. else sponsor = m,+l
. update the sponsor field along the path of the joining member to the root if required
. generates new secret keys along the joining members path and distribute them to co-distributors and to other memberr directly by encrypting with common key and broadcasting I encrypt the key sent by the joining members sponsor with appropriate key and broadcast
Step 3: If joining member's sponsor is itself
Step 4: If cc-distributor is itself 
., m,.
A new member m,+l makes a join request by broadcasting its public key PK. The rightmost member in the key tree authenticates the new member, decides the insertion location for the new member and broadcasts this information to other members. Additionally the rightmost member also sends the virtual key tree and list of public keys of other members to the new member. All other members update the key tree by adding a new member node in the specified location. Then every member checks to see if it is the sponsor of the joining member. If the new member has a sibling it becomes the sponsor and generates new keys along the path.. If there is no sibling then the joining member itself becomes the sponsor and generates the new keys along its path and distributes them. Members update the sponsor field appropriately if required. Figure 6 describes the join protocol and Figure 7 shows the protocol operation when a new member joins. When a new member joins, m7 determines the position(i.e., ms) and places the member there. m7 broadcwts the position of the new member to other members.
All members also determine that m4 is the sponsor of m5. So m4 initiates the rekeying process as follows: 1) generates new keys k;-51 and k;l-7. 2) after determining the cedistributors m 3 and "7, encrypts as follows and broadcasts: {ki-7r k&-7}pk7, and { k h -7 } p k 3 , 3 ) . m3 will decrypt k;l-7 and encrypt it as {kh-7}ko-a and m 7 will decrypt k:--7 and kAm7 and encrypt them as { k i -7 } k 6 -, and {kb-7}k4-7r 4). m4 also encrypts and sends the keys to m5 as { k i -5 , k i -, , k h -7 } p k 6 . As a result, all the members will get the new keys.
When a new member joins, only the keys along its path to the root have to be changed and distributed, which can be achieved in two rounds with atmost logzn keys being changed.
F. Leave protocol
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Step 1: Every member updates the key tree by removing the leaving member node
. updates the sponsor field appropriately along the leaving members path if required . determines the sponsor for changing keys along the leaving members path
. generates new secret keys along the path and distributes them to co-distributors and directly to other members
. broadcasts the key sent by the leaving members sponsor by encrypting it with the appropriate key
Step 2: If sponsor of the leaving member is itself
Step 3: If cc-distributor is itself Assume that member ml leaves the group. Every member updates the key tree by deleting node ml and updates the sponsor field along the path if required. Then they determine the sponsor who generates new keys along the leaving members path and distributes them. If the leaving member does not have a sibling then the first sponsor along the leaving members path becomes responsible for changing the keys along the leaving member's path (See Figure 8) .
5
._' Sponsor Fig. 9 . A member mg leaves.
As shown in Figure 9 , when a member m5 leaves, all the members will remove the node and determine that m4 is the sponsor of m5. So m4 initiates the rekeying process as follows: 1) generates new keys kk--5, k i m r , and kb-,. 2) after determining the co-distributors m3 and m7, encrypts as follows and broadcasts:
and { k ; J -T } p k 3 ,
3).
m3 will decrypt kb-7 and encrypt it as {k;)-7}ko-3 and m 7
will decrypt kkT7 and khP7 and encrypt them as {ki-7}ks-7 and {kb--7}k4-7, 4). As a result, all the members will get the new keys. When a memher leaves only the keys along its path to the root have to be changed and distributed, which can be achieved in two rounds with at most lognn keys being changed.
U. Multzple join protocol
Suppose m new members join, they make a join request by broadcasting their public keys. The rightmost member i n the key tree authenticates the new members, decides the locations for all the new members such that minimal numher of keys are changed and broadcasts this information to other existing group members. The rightmost member also sends the virtual key tree and existing members public keys to the joining members. Every member upon receiving this message updates its key tree by adding m new nodes in the determined positions. In order to perform niultiple joins in one aggregate operation, it is required to find the common keys shared by the joining members in an efficient way. To achieve that we use an already proposed scheme, an efficient and scalable key tree based dynamic Step 3: If co-distributor is itself conferencing scheme called KTDC in [52] which uses an efficient algorithm for computing the shared keys. There will be multiple sponsors responsible for changing the necessary keys. But here the shared keys which both sponsors have in common and which need to be changed will be changed by the rightmost sponsor among the sponsors (See Figure 10) . Fig. 11 . New members mo, ml, m4 and mg join.
As shown in Figure 11 , when new members join, m 7 will determine the available positions (Le., ma, m l , m4, m5) and place the members there. m7 broadcasts this information to other group members. Ail members also know that m5 is the sponsor of m4 and ml is the sponsor of mo. They also know that m3 and m 7 are responsible for sending the key tree structure and the public key list to the joining members. m5 initiates the rekeying process as follows: 1) generates new keys k&-,, and khm7. 2) after determining the co-distributors m3 and m7, encrypts as follows and broadcasts: { k i -7 , I C ; ] -7 } p k 7 , and {kh--T}pk3, 3 ) . m3 will decrypt kbP7 and encrypt it as { k h --7 } k ; -3 and m7
will decrypt ki.-7 and kb-7 and encrypt them as { k i -7 } k s -7
and { k & -7 ) k 4 -7 , 4). m5 also encrypts and sends the keys to m4 as { k i p s , k i -7 , kh--l}pkd. Similarly ml regenerates the 
If. Multiple leave protocol
Step 1 . if rightmost sponsor, change the key and distribute
Step 3: If c-distributor is itself broadcasts the key sent by the leaving members sponsor by encrypting it with the common key When multiple members leave, every member updates its key tree by deleting those member nodes and the sponsor fields along all the paths. Then they determine the keys that need to he changed and thc sponsors responsible for changing those keys. There will he multiple sponsors and each sponsor regenerates the keys and distributes them. If two sponsors are responsible for changing the same key then the rightmost among the sponsors will change the key (See Figure 12) . ,.
I
. I I r . Fig. 13 . hlernbers mo> m l , m4 and ms leave
As shown in Figure 13 , when several rnenibers mo, ml, m4 and m5 leave, every member updates its key tree by and broadcasts it. Similarly 7713 generates the keys k& and encrypts it with k2-3 and broadcasts it. Both m3 and m.7 do these operations in parallel. As a result, all the members whose keys have been changed will get the new keys.
In case of a network failure which causes disconnectivity, the group gets split and this partition can be dealt with as a multiple leave operation. Thus, even for network partition the protocol requires only two rounds for regenerating and distributing the keys. This is a great improvement compared to TGDH which requires several rounds. [56] , (571 are non-scalable and/or non-dynamic. In contrast, the new DGKD protocol is not only scalable and dynamic but also able to provide easy and strong authentication. Consider two scenarios: (1) the sponsor m4 transmits a new key kh-7 to a cedistributor m3. (2) m3 transmits the key kt)-i to members m0,ml,m2 who are in the responsibility scope of m3. In the first case, m4 signs the key kh-,(using mq's private key), encrypts both kb-7 and the signed kb-,(using m3's public key pka), and sends the result to 7723. 7723 after receiving the message, decrypts k;l-7 and then verifies m4's signature. In the second case, m3 signs k;-,(by its private key), encrypts both kt)-i and the signed kkp7(using koP3 which covers mo to m3). Then each of the members from mo to m2 can verify m3's signature.
I. Authentication in DGKD
IV. DISCUSSIONS
We discuss the performance and security of our protocol in this section and analyze the communication and computation costs for join, leave, multiple join and multiple leave operations. Tree based Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) [19] , j34J is one of the most typical CGKA protocols in terms of efficiency and scalability, so we focus on the coniparison between DGKD and TGDH. Key generation is independent, i.e., only the sponsor is involved, thus there is no need for synchronization with other members which is required in TGDH. In this sense, DGKD is more resilient to network congestion, delay and failure than TGDH. DGKD also has strong yet simple authentication. It is also collusion free because the new keys are independent of the old keys and no matter how many members collude they cannot get the keys. Thus, it is unconditionally secure. Both TGDH and DGKD require
